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The neologists have been at it again. One of their recent contributions to
popular discourse is the term "outing," used to describe not a picnic but, in the
words of the new Webster's College Dictionary, "the intentional exposure of
a secret homosexual."' Once a tool of the Right Wing for harassing opponents,2
the exposure of prominent "closet" homosexuals has become a favorite tactic
of gay, lesbian, and bisexual3 activists bent on achieving various political ends,
including greater public acceptance of homosexuals, more sympathetic civil rights
legislation, and increased funding for AIDS research. According to its advocates,
outing serves three basic purposes: (1) to expose the illogic of governmental
I. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 960 (1992). As used in this Note, the term "outing" denotes the
imputation of homosexuality to a person, especially a public figure, by the media. The word "outing" derives
from the concept of forcing one "out of the closet" (i.e., out of privacy) about one's homosexuality. An
"out" homosexual admits to her sexual preferences. By the same logic, a "closet" or "closeted" homosexual
does not. One can be "out of the closet" to two different audiences: (1) to oneself and other homosexuals
and (2) to the public at large. See JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 322 (1989). The latter sense is the focus of this Note.
2. Bill Turque et al., The Age of 'Outing,' NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1991, at 22. Outing was used in the
McCarthy era to silence opponents. D'MFImjo & FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 292-94. More recently, editors
at The Dartmouth Review surreptitiously recorded a meeting of the Dartmouth Gay Students Association
and published excerpts of participants' comments. BENJAMIN HART, POISONED Ivy 249-50 (1984). The Review
article named two of the organization's leaders but did not identify other participants. State Won't Press
Dartmouth Case, N.Y. TIM., Oct. 9, 1984, at A20.
3. Increasingly, the term "gay" does not encompass lesbians or bisexuals. Eve Kosofsy Sedgwick,
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 17-18 (1990). Critics believe that using the word as a gender-neutral term
is insensitive to the unique experience of homosexual women. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence, in WOMEN-SEX AND SEXUALrrY 62,80-81 (Catharine R. Stimson & Ethel Spector
Person eds., 1980). However, for the sake of brevity, this Note will use the terms "gay" and "homosexual"
interchangeably.
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policies that discriminate against homosexuals and of the hypocrisy of gay public
officials who publicly support such policies;4 (2) to provide positive examples
of gays, as role models to other gays and as ambassadors to mainstream
America;5 and (3) to break down the stigma surrounding homosexuality by
making it commonplace.'
In the past, outing stories were confined to the pages of gay community
publications and supermarket tabloids, and these two sources remain the primary
purveyors of such literature.7 However, a recent spate of outings involving
prominent figures has focused national attention on the subject.8 As a result,
several well-respected newspapers and magazines have devoted stories to the
outing phenomenon; some have even reported specific allegations, including
the names of targets.9 By reporting the allegations of tabloids and gay publica-
tions, the mainstream media itself effectively engages in-and furthers the
purposes of---outing. The longstanding journalistic taboo that has kept the
4. For example, the national gay periodical The Advocate published a story alleging that Department
of Defense spokesman Pete Williams was gay in order to call attention to the purported hypocrisy of the
Pentagon's policy of excluding homosexuals from the armed services. See Michelangelo Signorile, The Outing
of Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams, THE ADVOcATE, Aug. 27, 1991, at 34; William A. Henry
111, To "Out" or Not to "Out," TIME, Aug. 19, 1991, at 17.
5. Gabriel Rotello. former editor of the defunct New York City gay magazine OutWeek, told the New
York Times, "It's taken for granted that other minorities deserve to have role models, so why not gays?"
Dirk Johnson, Privacy vs. the Pursuit of Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at A21. Michelangelo
Signorile, former features editor of OutWeek and an ardent outing advocate, explained, "[w]e're saying
homosexuality is natural; it's normal... [I]s [homosexuality] so horrible [that] we should hide it? How
can we ever convince the public that homosexuality is normal unless we show the public who is gay?" Stephen
Randall, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1990, at 20. See also Zoe Heller, Outed: The Campaign Hits the Superstars, THE
INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (London), June 16, 1991, at 12.
6. Michelangelo Signorie argues that, just as tabloid coverage of Ingrid Bergman's out-of-wedlock
pregnancy helped break down societal stigmas surrounding illegitimacy, outing will allow greater openness
about homosexuality. Michelangelo Signorile, Address at Yale Law School Symposium, Outing: The Debate
Over Forcing Lesbian and Gay Public Figures Out of the Closet (Dec. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Signorile, Yale
Law School Address].
7. Outing is not an activity confined to the press. A group called "Outpost" plasters pictures of celebrities
around Manhattan with captions such as "Dyke," "Fag," and "Absolutely Queer." Heller, supra note 5.
Democratic Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts, who is openly gay, threatened to name homosexual
Republicans in Congress in reprisal for Republicans' insinuations that Democratic Representative (and then-
candidate for Speaker of the House) Tom Foley was homosexual. William A. Henry Ill, Forcing Gays Out
of the Closet, TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 67. Michael Petrelis, a gay activist in Washington, D.C., held a press
conference in May 1990 on the Capitol steps in which he read a list of 12 members of Congress whom he
alleged were homosexual. Charlotte Low Allen, The Word is "Outing": Conservatives and Gays, WAsH.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1990, at E2.
8. USA Today made outing a "cover story" on May 7, 1990, a sure sign that popular culture had taken
note of the phenomenon. See Craig Wilson, Forcing gay celebs out of the closet, USA TODAY, May 7, 1990,
at Dl.
9. The Washington Post, which does not print the names of outing targets, rather sanctimoniously
identified those publications that do. The list included the Oakland Tribune, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and
the Miami Herald. See Eleanor Randolph, The Media, at Odds Over 'Outing' of Gays, WASH. POST, July
13, 1990, atC1. USA Today peppered its discussion of the phenomenon with the names of outing "victims."
Wilson, supra note 8.
10. Or so argues George Will, who writes that "[tbhe respectable press [has] developted] a parasitic
relationship with the reckless media, such as the supermarket tabloids .... George F. Will, Privacy and
Predators, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1991, at A21.
Some would argue that including the names of outing targets in this Note constitutes a form of outing.
However, (I) the author makes no claims about the veracity of the allegations that these figures are
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press from reporting on the homosexuality of public figures is slowly eroding,"
setting the stage for further episodes of outing in the future.1
The controversy over outing began as an internal debate in gay communities
over the appropriateness of means to gain public acceptance; it has since
provoked a wide-ranging discussion of journalistic ethics in the mainstream
media. 3 Predictably, the controversy found its way into the courts.14 An
"outing" today potentially entails more than a bad sunburn or a few bee stings;
reporting sensitive information about a person's sexual preferences may result
in legal liability. The "invasion of privacy" tort regulates what truthful facts
about a person can be disclosed and consequently lies at the heart of the outing
controversy.'" Courts have attempted to balance the privacy rights of individual
homosexual; (2) not using actual names would be a futile gesture, because all names mentioned here have
appeared in several major newspapers or magazines; (3) the author believes that the educational value of
having real-life examples outweighs the minuscule injury of having names repeated in this Note.
11. Rona Barrett, a prominent gossip columnist, once noted that "[hiomosexuality is the only subject
still taboo in America.' Linda Bird Francke et al., Gossip Mania, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1976, at 56, 64.
More recently, a tabloid editor observed, "We're now treating gay liaisons with about the same nonchalance
as we do heterosexual. What wasn't permissible [a] number of years ago is now permissable [sic]." Pat H.
Broeske & John M. Wilson, Outing Target Hollywood, L.A. TIMEs, July 22, 1990, at F86 (quoting Richard
Kaplan, Editor of the Star). Another gossip columnist has remarked that, though she was initially "shocked"
by the outing trend, today "it's as legitimate to write about gay relationships as it is to write about Liz and
Dick." Id. at F89 (quoting Janet Charlton of the Star).
12. Richard Rouilard, Editor-in-Chief of The Advocate, told the Los Angeles Times, "We're in favor
of outing .... We're working on outing stories on right-wing politicians and Vatican officials." Beth Ann
Krier, Media: Some Say the Practice of 'Outing' May Have Benefited Gay Rights, LA. TIMEs, Dec. 31,
1990, at E2. Michelangelo Signorile, himself responsible for outing Malcolm Forbes and Pete Williams,
displays no intention to curtail his efforts. See Signorile, Yale Law School Address, supra note 6. The National
Enquirer boasts that it is "sitting on hundreds of names." Broeske & Wilson, supra note 11, at F90 (quoting
an anonymous source at the Enquirer).
13. See, e.g., Randolph, supra note 9; Turque et al., supra note 2, at 23; Will, supra note 10.
14. Just last year, actor Tom Selleck sued the tabloid the Globe for $20 million, claiming that the
newspaper had libeled him by reprinting allegations made in a poster campaign that he was homosexual.
The parties settled the suit prior to trial. See Mark Lundgren, Personals, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16, 1991, at
E3; Outing Lawsuit Resolved, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 6, 199 1, at 9. Less than two weeks later, the Globe
printed an article entitled, "Macho Newlywed Lyle Alzado Is Dying ... and Male Hookers Say NFL Hunk
Is Secret Gay." The former professional football player sued for defamation. See Milt Poliezer, Novel Defense:
No Stigma = No Libel, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 9, 1991, at 6.
15. The tort of defamation is also implicated by outing incidents, but whereas the privacy tort concerns
truthful disclosures, defamation concerns false statements of fact which injure a person's reputation (truth
is a complete defense to a defamation action). This Note does not discuss defamation except as it is relevant
to the privacy tort. This is not because of a naive belief that "in the typical outing case, the allegations...
are true." Ronald F. Wick, Note, Out of the Closet and Into the Headlines: "Outing" and the Private Facts
Tort, 80 GEO. LJ. 413, 415 (1991). The nature of sexuality is such that, short of a public declaration, one
can never be sure of another's preferences. Instead, this Note focuses on the privacy tort because the current
law of defamation is adequate to handle cases in which the allegations are patently false. See infra note 148
and accompanying text. Novel legal issues arise when the allegations are, at least in some part, true, because
it is then that naming names has the potential to suppress unpopular viewpoints.
A person's sexual preference is an inherently slippery matter, not amenable to ready observation or
proof while at the same time a favorite topic of idle speculation. With such great potential for error, it is
not surprising that the vast majority of lawsuits involving the imputation of homosexuality are actions for
defamation, not for invasion ofprivacy. Plaintiffs may choose to sue for defamation (I) because they actually
are heterosexual, (2) because they do not wish to admit their homosexuality by bringing a privacy action,
or simply (3) because of a perception that the chances for recovery of damages are slightly better in actions
for defamation. For a discussion of the implications of outing on the tort of defamation, see Jon E. Grant,
Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Court's Categorical
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plaintiffs against societal rights of free speech. In so doing, the judiciary has
developed intricate rules for recovery of damages in such tort actions.
This Note examines whether current privacy law adequately balances
individual and societal rights, and finds that it does not. Courts fail to recognize
the full scope of interests protected by privacy rights. As a consequence, when
privacy rights come into conflict with First Amendment interests, however slight,
courts favor the latter. The privacy tort survives at the fringes of the law,
eviscerated by a "newsworthiness" standard that systematically overprotects
speech at the expense of privacy rights and accords full First Amendment
protection to the disclosure of celebrities' slightest peccadillos. 16 Closer
examination of the interests advanced by privacy rights, aided by analysis of
the outing experience, demonstrates the need for a new balance. This Note argues
for a revised standard of newsworthiness that would be sensitive to the nature
of the information involved, and under which disclosure of a public figure's
homosexuality would have to be relevant to a matter of legitimate public concern
to be privileged under the First Amendment.'
7
Part I outlines the current contours of the invasion of privacy tort. Part II
examines the importance of privacy, as demonstrated by the outing phenomenon.
Part III discusses when disclosure of a public figure's homosexuality is protected
by the First Amendment and proposes a new standard for determining newsworthiness.
Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 103, 121-27 (1991).
The torts of defamation and invasion of privacy are designed to remedy distinct types of harms.
Defamation concerns injury done to an individual's reputation, which "lower[s] him in the estimation of
his fellows"; the wrong involved in defamation is "material, rather than spiritual." Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1890). The gravamen of a privacy
action is invasion of the right to "an inviolate personality," id. at 205, which courts have interpreted to mean
infringing an individual's independence, dignity, and integrity. Emotional distress may be one result. See
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962,970 (1964). The law of defamation is relevant to the outing debate because it also seeks to balance
common law tort rights and constitutional rights to free speech. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile," 64 IOWA L. REV.
1111, 1133-34 (1979).
17. Some may argue that the Supreme Court's recent decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), precludes judicial recognition of a cause of action encompassing outing. In R.A.V.,
the Court struck down a St. Paul municipal ordinance outlawing the placement of "symbol[s] ... which
... arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" as
facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. at 2541, 2547. The statute at issue in R.A.V. bears
a superficial resemblance to the privacy tort, in that both would penalize potentially inflammatory speech
relating to membership in a minority. However, a fortified privacy tort, like that suggested in this Note,
does not necessarily implicate the concerns animating the Court in RAY.. The Court was not troubled by
the regulation of speech based on content (here, "fighting words"). Id. at 2543. Instead, the Court found
the St. Paul statute invalid because it regulated speech based on whether it came within one of the disfavored
categories, speech "that communicate[s] messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance." Id. at 2549.
As Justice Stevens explained, the majority believed the statute "regulate[d] expression based on viewpoint."
Id. at 2570 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, the privacy tort advanced in this Note is viewpoint-neutral.
The cause of action would be available regardless of the political views of the outer. Furthermore, the cause




I. INVASION OF PRIVACY BY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
"There's no such thing as privacy rights .... That's just something
the Supreme Court said. It's nowhere in the Constitution.' 'r8
These are not the words of Robert Bork, although they could be.19 The
quoted speaker is instead gay activist Michelangelo Signorile. Signorile is right
on one count: privacy rights appear nowhere in the text of the constitution. But
he is wrong on another count: there is such a thing as a right to privacy, which
is alive (if not entirely well) in the common law of the states.
Blanket use of the term "the right to privacy" generates confusion among
both laypersons and lawyers. The constitutional "right to privacy"--the bane
of Professor Bork-encompasses two distinct varieties of interests. One type
"is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" by the
government.2 The second type is "the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions," involving "matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education."21 The two interests are commonly referred to as the "confidentiality"
and "autonomy" interests, respectively.
22
The right discussed in this Note is the common law, tort-based right of
privacy, which is enforceable against private parties such as the media.
Constitutional privacy, on the other hand, is enforceable against the government.
While the underlying interest in inviolate personality is the same for both the
constitutional and tort actions, the difference between state and nonstate action
is constitutionally significant because common conceptions of appropriate
behavior for private persons and government officials are differentY2
3
18. Allen, supra note 7, at E2 (quoting Michelangelo Signorile).
19. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTIG OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 97,
113 (1990) (criticizing Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
20. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
21. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1017 (1983).
22. Id. It is the autonomy interest in privacy that is at the center of the abortion controversy. The
autonomy interest is also at stake in sodomy cases. In 1986, the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy
did not apply to consensual homosexual activity and thus that states were free to outlaw sodomy. See Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). The Court held that the privacy right was
restricted to matters of "family, marriage, or procreation," and not to sodomy. Id. at 190-9 1. However, that
holding should be read narrowly, as applying only to the autonomy interest in privacy, and not to the
confidentiality interest The confidentiality interest in privacy is evidently much broader than the autonomy
interest, extending to other personal matters such as finances. Compare Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119,
1132 (5th Cir.) (holding that autonomy interest does not cover "financial privacy"), reh'g denied, 580 F.2d
1052 (5th Cir. 1978) with Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 115 (holding that certain financial
information "is entitled to privacy protection").
23. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391-92
(1971) (rejecting respondents' efforts "to treat the relationship between a citizen and a federal agent
unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different from the relationship between two private citizens").
1992]
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A. Development of the Public Disclosure Tort
In 1890, as a reaction to the perceived excesses of "yellow journalism,"
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, an article
arguing that such a right was implicit in the common law.2 The authors noted
that the law had gradually expanded its protection of the individual from property
and person to include reputation and emotional well-being2 Analyzing various
judicial decisions, they detected the presence of an implied right of privacy, and
argued that violation of such a right should give rise to a distinct cause of
21action.
Courts and legislatures were slow to accept the tort, and it developed
erratically. After the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize a cause
of action for invasion of privacy, 7 the New York legislature created one in
1903.28 The Georgia Supreme Court allowed a cause of action for a man whose
name and picture were used in connection with a spurious advertising testi-
monial.29 Kansas recognized a similar cause of action in 1918;30 Kentucky
followed suit in 1927.31
For most of this century, judicial opinion strongly favored individual rights
to privacy over the media's reporting interest. 32 The famous case of Melvin
v. Reid33 involved a former prostitute who was tried for murder and acquitted,
later marrying and resuming life as an average citizen. She brought suit against
a filmmaker who, seven years later, released a movie based on her life, using
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15.
25. Id. at 194-95.
26. Id. at 195-98.
27. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (concerning use of plaintiff's
picture to advertise flour without her consent). Prior to this decision, lower courts had accepted the existence
of privacy rights. The first case to allow recovery on the independent basis of the right of privacy enjoined
a defendant from publishing a picture of an actress wearing tights. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 850 n.10 (5th ed. 1984).
28. N.Y. Civ. RIOHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992). However, the New York provision was a narrow
reaction to the Roberson case, merely making unlawful the use of "the name, portrait or picture of any living
person" for the "purposes of trade." Id. The statute does not encompass the public disclosure of private facts.
See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1985).
29. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905).
30. Kunz v. Alien, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918).
31. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967,971 (Ky. 1927) (holding public posting of notice of overdue account
to be invasion of privacy).
32. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975) ('iMhe century has experienced
a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy."). Examples of judicial concern for privacy
rights abound. See, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (holding that use
of victim's name in radio dramatization of crime created cause of action for invasion of privacy); Daily
Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (unauthorized use of photograph depicting woman
at county fair whose dress had blown up); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 162 P.2d 133, 139 (Ariz.
1945) (unauthorized use of photo accompanying magazine story on a crime); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (publication of photo); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930)
(unauthorized publication of photograph of malformed child); Trammel v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d
708 (Ky. 1941) (newspaper publication of payment overdue notice); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103
N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913) (use of likeness in a film).
33. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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her actual name.34 The court held that, absent the use of her name, the film
would have been protected because the public had a right to know the details
of the trial, which were a matter of public record; however, the use of the
plaintiff's name was not itself "justified," and thus fell outside the public's need
to know.35 Barber v. Time, Inc.36 concerned the publication of a magazine
article discussing one woman's rare eating disorder. The story featured her
photograph above the caption, "Insatiable-Eater Barber ... She eats for ten. 37
The court held the publication to be actionable, commenting, "[w]hile plaintiff's
ailment may have been a matter of some public interest because unusual,
certainly the identity of the person who suffered this ailment was not."38
The plaintiff in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.39 did not fare as well. Sidis
involved a faded former child prodigy who, having hoped to live his adult life
in obscurity, sued after a magazine article reported on his eccentricities in graphic
detail. Although the Sidis court recognized that "[r]evelations may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency," it affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The
court recognized newsworthiness as a limitation on the public disclosure tort,
reasoning that "at some point the public interest in obtaining information
becomes dominant over the individual's desire for privacy.'" '
Incorporation into the first Restatement of Torts helped popularize the tort,
aided its development, and promoted standardization between states.42
Eventually, William Prosser distilled the tort of invasion of privacy into four
distinct causes of action, one of which is the public disclosure of private facts.
43
Today, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia recognize the public
disclosure of private facts tort.44 The most common form of the tort sets forth
34. Id. at 91.
35. Id. at 93.
36. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
37. Id. at 293.
38. Id. at 295.
39. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
40. Id. at 809. The Sidis court was the first of many to make such an acknowledgement while denying
recovery to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967).
41. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
42. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939); KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, § 117, at 851.
43. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). The four causes of action are (1)
appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage, (2) unreasonable intrusion into
plaintiff's solitude, "seclusion," or "private affairs," (3) public disclosure of private facts, and (4) publicity
that places plaintiff in a false light. See generally KEETON Er AL., supra note 27, § 117, at 851-66 (outlining
four causes of action and relevant caselaw). Not everyone agrees with Prosser's four-part formulation of
the tort. One commentator has argued that Prosser's conception of the tort "repudiate[d] Warren and Brandeis
by suggesting that privacy is not an independent value at all but rather a composite of the interests in
reputation, emotional tranquility and intangible property." Bloustein, supra note 15, at 962. Others have
noted that the core of Warren and Brandeis' tort is the public disclosure of private facts, and that the other
three causes of action are "scions of meretricious liaisons between privacy and the torts of trespass,
defamation, and passing-off or trade-mark infringement." Ellis, supra note 16, at 1111.
44. Steven I. Katz, Comment, Unauthorized Biographies and Other "Books ofRevelations," 36 UCLA
L. REV. 815, 819-20 (1989). Five states (Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky, Montana, and Wyoming) have yet
to recognize the public disclosure tort. Seven states (Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North
1992]
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four requirements of a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts:
(1) public disclosure; (2) of private facts; (3) concerning a matter which would
be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person; and (4) which is
not of legitimate concern to the public.45 Unlike the tort of defamation, truth
is no defense.46
B. The Public Disclosure Tort, Newsworthiness, and the First Amendment
A tort based on the publication of truthful information is necessarily bounded
by the First Amendment. The public disclosure tort internalizes free speech
concerns in the form of the common law "newsworthiness" test, which is
coextensive with First Amendment protections.4 7 This test limits liability to
statements that are not "newsworthy"-that is, not of legitimate concern to the
public! 8 Thus, a finding that a statement is "newsworthy" is a complete defense
to the public disclosure tort. 49 Newsworthiness is a conclusion reached by
weighing the competing interests of the public's "right to know" against the
individual's right to keep private facts from the public's gaze.50 A judge may
determine that a particular publication was newsworthy as a matter of law;
otherwise, newsworthiness is a question of fact for the jury.51 The Restatement
Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia) have expressly refused to recognize the public disclosure tort. Id. at 820 n.20.
Some recognize the private facts tort by statute, others recognize it in caselaw. See generally LIBEL DEFENSE
RESOURCE CENTER, 50-STATE SURVEY 1990-91: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA LIBEL AND INVASION
OF PRIVACY LAW (8th ed. 1990-91) [hereinafter LDRC SURVEY] (citing and discussing each state's law).
45. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the public disclosure tort in the following manner
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The requirements vary slightly from state to state.
46. See, e.g., Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1350 (Del. 1992).
47. See Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271,274 (5th Cir.) ("[Tihe constitution bar[s]
liability for the dissemination of true, private information if no liability would exist under the common law
tort."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D, cmt. d (1977)
("When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of privacy.
This has now become a rule not just of the common law of torts, but of the Federal Constitution as well.").
Time, Inc. v. Hill also emphasized the relevance of "legitimate public concern" in determining whether First
Amendmentprotection extended to a particular disclosure of information: "Freedom of discussion, if it would
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." 385 U.S. 374,
388 (1967) (quoting Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h (1977).
49. Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 293 (N.J. 1988); Wick, supra note 15, at 425. A judge may
determine as a matter of law that a statement does not constitute "morbid and sensational prying" and thus
is newsworthy under the Restatement standard. See infra text accompanying note 53. If so, the defendant
will prevail. Otherwise, the jury (or other finder of fact) will determine newsworthiness. Wick, supra note
15, at 425.
50. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cl. Rptr. 762, 771 (Ct. App. 1983).
51. See id. at 772-73.
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articulation of the newsworthiness test, which has enjoyed widespread popularity
in the courts, 2 states that:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account
must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and
in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community
mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would
say that he had no concern. 3
Some argue that because the media's vocation is to determine what is
newsworthy and what is not, anything that is published is newsworthy. This
view mistakenly equates public interest with the "public's appetite," 54 and its
adoption would eliminate the public disclosure tort altogether.55
The category of newsworthy information has undergone a steady expansion
since the early 1950's, as courts have become increasingly solicitous of free
speech56 and increasingly reluctant to, in the words of one court, "sit as
censors. ' 57 Disclosures are most intrusive when they clearly identify, by name,
the persons involved. Courts once were willing to grant recovery when an
otherwise newsworthy publication revealed the name of the plaintiff because
"identification of the actor" associated with an embarrassing revelation "serve[d]
little independent public purpose."58 But this was the era when names were
52. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305,307-08 (10th Cir. 1981); Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior
Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556,566 (Ct App. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom Times Mirror Co. v. Doe, 489 U.S.
1094 (1989); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, 448 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Conn. 1982); Howard
v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289,302 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980);
Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d at 293-94; Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711,714 (N.C. 1988).
53. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h (1977); see also Linda N. Woito & Patrick
McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide
Newsworthiness? 64 IOWA L. REV. 185 (1979) (arguing that, as with obscenity, newsworthiness should be
decided in accordance with community mores).
54. Ellis, supra note 16, at 1142.
55. Wick, supra note 15, at 424-25. Taken to the extreme, it would also destroy copyright, because
the press could always justify the unauthorized reprinting of copyrighted material on the ground that the
public was interested in it. See Ellis, supra note 16, at 1142.
56. See David Goldberger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for
Suppressing Racist, Sexist, and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1167 & n.13 (1991)
(noting expansion of First Amendment protection for offensive communications).
57. Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 904 (1980).
58. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 39-40 (Cal. 1971); see also Melvin v. Reid, 297
P. 91,93 (Cal. Ct App. 1931). Both cases involved persons who were tried for crimes (Briscoe was convicted)
and had their identities revealed years afterwards. Although their names were a matter of public record, the
courts reasoned that they had resumed leading "lawful and unexciting" lives, Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 40, and
that identification of their names with crime consequently served no public purpose. Id.
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"changed to protect the innocent."59 The tide of judicial sentiment has since
turned sharply, and several state and lower federal courts have found the
disclosure of names to be newsworthy. °
In a series of recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court found that
the disclosure of names was protected by the First Amendment and thus did
not constitute an impermissible invasion of privacy.6 However, these cases
focused less on the inherent newsworthiness of individuals' names than on the
privacy of the facts: in all four cases, the names were already a matter of public
record. In the first case, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,62 a television
broadcast mentioned the name of a rape victim. Publicly available court records
contained the victim's name, and the court held that "publishing the contents
of public records" was outside the reach of privacy actions.63 Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court' involved a pretrial order enjoining publication
of the name of a juvenile accused of murder. Because the name had already
been publicly revealed at the juvenile detention hearings, the Court found no
cause of action for invasion of privacy.65 Similarly, in Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing,66 which also involved the publication of the identity of an accused
juvenile murderer, the Court held the information to be in the public domain,
because it had been broadcast previously over police radio.67 Most recently,
in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,s police released the name of a rape victim and a
newspaper reprinted the information in violation of a state statute. The Court
again held that the government had placed the information "in the public
domain ' 69 and denied recovery to the plaintiff.
59. To quote the introduction to a once popular television show. Dragnet (NBC Television series, 1967-
70).
60. See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir.) (finding rape
victim's name was "of unique importance to the credibility and persuasive force of the story" and thus of
legitimate public interest), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co., 283 N.W.2d at 303 (concluding that name of woman who had been involuntarily sterilized "offered
a personalized frame of reference to which the reader could relate, fostering perception and understanding.
... [I]t lent specificity and credibility to the report.").
61. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
62. 420 U.S. 469.
63. Id. at 494.
64. 430 U.S. 308.
65. Id. at 311.
66. 443 U.S. 97.
67. Id. at 103.
68. 491 U.S. 524.
69. Id. at 538.
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C. Sex and Public Disclosure
As Warren and Brandeis noted over a century ago,7" sex and sexuality are
considered to reside at the very core of privacy interests.7' Perhaps because
sex is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life,
community welfare, and the development of human personality,, 72 people
typically are tight-lipped about sexuality, jealously guarding facts concerning
their relationships, whether homosexual or heterosexual. 73 Courts recognize
the importance of keeping such information private.74 Although many cases
have involved the disclosure of sex-related information, only two have
specifically considered the privacy of sexuality. We will now consider those
cases in turn.
1. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.
75
In 1975, an ex-Marine named Oliver Sipple foiled an attempt on President
Gerald Ford's life by striking the arm of assailant Sara Jane Moore as she was
about to fire her gun.76 As a result, Sipple became the focus of considerable
media attention.77 "I\vo days after the assassination attempt, the San Francisco
Chronicle published a column revealing Sipple's prominence in the local gay
community. Other newspapers quickly followed suit; some papers speculated
that President Ford had failed to express his thanks promptly because of Sipple's
sexual orientation.78 Although open about his homosexuality in San Francisco,
frequenting gay bars, marching in gay parades, and associating with leaders of
the gay movement, Sipple sued the Chronicle for public disclosure, claiming
70. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 216 (listing the "relations of an individual" as one of "the
matters of which the publication should be repressed").
71. See, e.g., T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE
LAW OF MASS MEDIA 208 (5th ed. 1991) (stating that sexual topics "are generally thought to involve the
most intimate matters"); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 280 (1977)
("By any standard of intuition or analysis, those intimacies begin with the body and its sexuality.").
72. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
73. An unusual propensity to sue over the disclosure of sexual matters demonstrates public reticence
about sex. See CARTER, supra note 7 1, at 208 (noting that most public disclosure cases involve sexual topics);
see also Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990) (involving public disclosure that woman had had
hysterectomy); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App. 1990) (involving couple who
had been filmed attending hospital program commemorating successful in vitro fertilizations).
74. See Thome v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding inquiry into sex life
of applicant for police force to be unconstitutional), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984); Young v. Jackson,
572 So. 2d at 382 ("It requires little awareness of personal prejudice and human nature to know that, generally
speaking, no aspect[] of life is more personal and private than those having to do with one's sexual organs
and reproductive system."); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d at 500 ("ITihe right of privacy has been held
to apply particularly to sexual matters or matters of procreation.").
75. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
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that he had kept his homosexuality private from relatives. 79 As a result of the
disclosure, Sipple claimed, his family had abandoned him, and he had been
exposed to "contempt and ridicule causing him great mental anguish, embarrass-
ment and humiliation., 80 After preliminary discovery, the San Francisco County
Superior Court granted summary judgment for the newspaper.8
The appellate court upheld the motion for summary judgment on two
grounds.82 First, the facts disclosed by the Chronicle were not private facts.
Sipple's sexual orientation was well known to "hundreds of people in a variety
of cities. '83 Because information about Sipple's homosexuality was "already
in [the] public domain," the articles "did no more than give further publicity
to matters which [Sipple] left open to the eye of the public .. . ."' Second,
the court held that the facts disclosed were newsworthy, finding that their
publication had been prompted by "legitimate political considerations": the desire
to combat the stereotype of gays as "timid, weak and unheroic" and to discuss
the potential biases of the President.85 The court also noted that the publication
of Sipple's homosexuality was not "so offensive.., as to shock the community
notions of decency.
' 86
2. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.87
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. involved a newspaper columnist's revelation
that Toni Diaz, the first female student body president of a California college,
was a transsexual. 88 Diaz contended that, as a result of the publication, she
became depressed and suffered insomnia, nightmares, and memory lapses.89
Affirming the lower court's findings, the Diaz court found that because Diaz
had kept the sex-change surgery "secret from all but her immediate family and
closest friends," her sexual identity was a private fact.90 In discussing the
newsworthiness of the disclosure, the court emphasized the purpose of First
Amendment protection: "[To keep the public informed so that they may make
intelligent decisions on matters important to a self-governing people."9' Though
Diaz was involved in a public controversy (she had charged the college
administration with misuse of student funds), the court found the disclosure of




82. Id. at 668.
83. Id. at 669.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 670.
86. Id.
87. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
88. Id. at 765.
89. Id. at 774.
90. Id. at 765,771.
91. Id. at 767 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-93 (1975)).
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Diaz's transsexuality to be irrelevant to this matter and thus unnewsworthy.92
The court explained that "[t]he fact that she is a transsexual does not adversely
reflect on her honesty or judgment. Nor does the fact that she was the first
woman student body president, in itself, warrant that her entire private life be
open to public inspection." 93 The court dismissed the newspaper's attempts
to paint the disclosure as newsworthy by asserting that the article was intended
to enlighten the public on "the changing roles of women in society."94 The
"tenor of the article" made clear that the author intended no purpose beyond
the stark revelation. 95
D. The Relevance of Public Figure Status to the Public Disclosure Tort
T\vo distinct types of public figures can be distinguished in the caselaw:
limited-purpose public figures and general-purpose public figures. The category
of limited-purpose public figures includes people who have voluntarily injected
themselves or been drawn into a particular public controversy.96 Courts consider
limited-purpose public figures to have forfeited their privacy with respect to
events that made them famoUS. 9 7 Toni Diaz exemplifies this category. As
student body president, she had become "a public figure for some purposes.
'98
Since her sexuality was not related to her public status, she had not forfeited
her sexual privacy.99 The category of general-purpose public figures consists
of people commonly known as "celebrities." '00 Many courts seem to consider
92. Id. at 773.
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. The article stated, in relevant part:
The students at the College of Alameda will be surprised to learn [that] their student body
president, Toni Diaz, is no lady, but is in fact a man whose real name is Antonio.
Now I realize, that in these times, such a matter is no big deal, but I suspect his female
classmates in P.E. 97 may wish to make other showering arrangements.
Id. at 766. The remainder of the article discussed completely unrelated subjects. See id. at 775-76.
96. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
97. RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f (1977).
98. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (Ct. App. 1983).
99. Id. The columnist who outed Toni Diaz could not claim that his revelation alone made Diaz a public
figure for purposes of her sexuality. The Supreme Court has held in the related area of defamation law that
such "bootstrapping" is not a defense. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) ("[Tlhose charged
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public
figure.").
100. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401,404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (asserting
that "[t]here is little doubt that [Ann-Margret], who has starred in numerous movies ... is, as the term has
come to be understood, a 'public figure"). Prosser and Keeton define a public figure as
a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character,
has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included
in this category are.., an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer.
... [as well as] public officers, famous inventors and explorers, [and] war heroes .... It includes,
in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as
a person.
KEETON Er AL., supra note 27, § 117, at 859-60 (citations omitted).
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stories about general-purpose public figures to be ipso facto newsworthy
regardless of their subject matter. Acknowledging broad popular interest in the
lives of celebrities, courts have established a "constitutional privilege" to report
"facts, events, and information relating to public figures."'0 '
While the Restatement suggests that "[t]here may be some intimate details
of her life, such as sexual relations, which even the actress is entitled to keep
to herself,"' 02 courts have yet to fulfill the promise of this intuitively appealing
dictum. The court in Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.'03 denied
recovery to an actress who had been portrayed nude in a magazine without her
consent, in part because the photograph was of "a woman who has occupied
the fantasies of many moviegoers" and its publication thus concerned "a matter
of great interest to many people."'' 4 This outcome is typical; though charitable
in their rhetoric, courts balk at actually granting recovery. 5 Many jurisdictions
have expressly found that public figures may not maintain a cause of action for
comments published about their private lives.'
°6
The primary rationale for denying privacy rights to public figures is that,
by attaining notoriety, public figures have consented to publicity and thus waived
their right to privacy.'07 This argument does not fare well under scrutiny. In
situations involving private figures, three criteria must be met to support a
finding of implied assumption of risk: the conduct must manifest consent, the
risk must be encountered voluntarily, and the risk must be encountered with
full knowledge and appreciation. 08
Traditionally, consent to waive rights must be at least clearly implied in
conduct 09 For example, consenting to be photographed might constitute a
relinquishment of rights to sue following publication of that photograph.110
101. Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit observed,
"[rlegrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of... 'public figures' are subjects of considerable interest
and discussion to the rest of the population." Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
102. RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h (1977).
103. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
104. Id. at 405.
105. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,383 n.7 (1967) ('This limitation to newsworthy persons
and events does not of course foreclose... [the recovery of] damages where [rievelations may be so intimate
and unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency.") (citation
omitted); Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 404 ("It is clear that a public figure does
not, simply by virtue of his or her notoriety, lose all rights to privacy."). In each of these cases, the plaintiff
was denied recovery.
106. See 1 SLADE R. MErCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND
REPORTERS § 2.22 (1982).
107. This claim is comparable to the "assumption of risk" argument for public figures in defamation
jurisprudence. Here, however, the greater ability of public figures to rebut comments is not implicated because,
by hypothesis, the facts disclosed are true. See Katz, supra note 44, at 830; Melville B. Nimmer, The Right
to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CAL. L. REV. 935, 961 (1968).
108. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, § 68, at 484-92.
109. Id. at 484-86.
110. See, e.g., Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988) ("While a person may have a legitimate
interest in protecting his or her identity from exploitation by others, that interest is minimal when the person
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Conduct in excess of that consented to is not protected. 1 ' Thus, explicit
consent to publication in one medium (say, books) may not be a defense against
an action stemming from publication in another medium (say, newspapers).
12
Giving an interview may not necessarily imply consenting to be named in
print." 3 Clearly, judicial ideas of what constitutes "consent" change drastically
when publication involves public figures.
Volition is also frequently missing in cases in which courts deny recovery.
A person does not consent to intrusive publicity merely by graduating from
college at the age of sixteen.. or by being born to famous parents.1 5 To
recover under the public disclosure tort, the publication must be "highly
offensive" and unreasonable;" 6 it seems fanciful to suggest that even a public
figure would voluntarily and knowingly consent to such publicity. A hypothetical
Dominican baseball player who, because of his talent, is brought up to the
American major leagues has not voluntarily forfeited all rights regarding his
personal life in the same way that, for example, Mick Jagger (who clearly
cultivates notoriety) has. Courts have, on occasion, implicitly recognized parties'
intent not to waive important privacy interests, especially in situations involving
sexual intimacy.
1 7
Under general tort principles, knowledge of a general risk may not suffice
for a finding of waiver;, courts often require knowledge of the specific risk that
caused the plaintiff's harm."8 The knowledge requirement should frustrate
a finding of waiver in a case involving sex-related disclosures. It is doubtful
that many celebrities knowingly assumed this unusual risk. While our hypo-
thetical baseball player may have assumed the general risk that his inability to
hit curve balls or his mercurial temper in the dugout would become legitimate
topics of some public interest, it is less likely he considered the specific risk
of having his sexual proclivities announced to the world.
allows his picture to be taken in a public or semi-public place ... ").
111. See, e.g., Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 84 (W.Va. 1984).
112. See McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 527, 529-30 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that,
although plaintiff consented to be photographed by photographer who said that "he wanted to publish a book,"
that consent did not extend to publication of photograph in weekly newspaper).
113. Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 145, 146 (S.C. 1986) (holding that, while plaintiff spoke
knowing that reporter was writing an article on teenage pregnancy, plaintiff did not consent to being
identified), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986).
114. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
115. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that children of Rosenbergs are
public figures because of their parents' highly-publicized trial for divulging atomic secrets), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
116. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c (1977).
117. Gerety, supra note 71, at 295 n.215 (concluding that Supreme Court's reluctance to find plaintiff
a public figure in 7ime, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), "derives from the legitimate concern that
as to sexual intimacy at least none of the parties in fact intended to waive their rights to privacy").
118. KEETON ET AL.., supra note 27, § 68, at 487. For example, a person at a hockey game may have
assumed the risk of known dangers, such as being hit by a puck, but not assumed the risk of unknown
dangers, such as being hit by a runaway Zamboni.
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The inappropriateness of the doctrine of implied assumption of risk to public
figures has led some to conclude that this concept is more accurately termed
"constructive waiver." It is merely a way of restating the conclusion that First
Amendment considerations trump any privacy rights claimed by public
figures." 9
II. RESUSCITATING THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TORT:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUTING
The right to privacy is in danger of becoming-and indeed may have already
become-a right surviving only in dicta. 20 Recent jurisprudence and critical
commentary have irrevocably and unconditionally subordinated the right to
privacy to the First Amendment.' The outing of prominent homosexuals
presents a situation in which common law privacy rights clash directly with the
constitutional right to free speech and a free press. Critics of outing bemoan
the fact that the public disclosure tort is so anaemic that "it probably would offer
no protection against so egregious an intrusion as outing.
'122
Commentators and jurists afford privacy so little weight because they
misunderstand its importance."2 Many assume, as Prosser seemingly did, that
public disclosure of private information implicates only minor, common law
rights against the infliction of psychological distress.124 Properly viewed,
119. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort
Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L. REV. 611, 627 (1968); Peter L FeIcher and Edward L.
Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal ofReal People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ. 1577, 1587 (1979).
It seems unfair to say public figures have forfeited their right to privacy. Notoriety is frequently an
unintended, if not unwelcome, byproduct of their efforts. Talented people will be discouraged from the full
use of their talents if they are rewarded by microscopic scrutiny of their personal lives. Persons entering
fields which expose them to the public eye must consider the loss of virtually all claims and expectations
of privacy in calculating the costs of such a move. Respect for privacy would lower these costs. Ruth Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 456 (1980).
120. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,533 (1989) (noting that privacy rights are "plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society"). Justice Stevens recognized in Supreme
Court jurisprudence a constitutionally endowed "zone of privacy" that involves "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters .... Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977). See also Virgil
v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 n.8 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976) (quoting Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)) (stating that privacy "reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty").
121. See supra text accompanying notes 56-69. Justice White has observed that "the trend in 'modem'
jurisprudence has been to eclipse an individual's right to maintain private any truthful information that the
press wished to publish." Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. at 553 (White, J., dissenting). See generally Diane
L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight. A Farewell to Warren andBrandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 291 (1983) (arguing, inter alia, that public disclosure tort is moribund and should be abandoned).
122. Wick, supra note 15, at 433.
123. Judge Bazelon wrote, "Perhaps privacy is not given the recognition it deserves as a fundamental
value simply because the concept is so difficult to formulate or justify in nonsubjective terms." David L.
Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 588 (1977). This is because "[u]ntil very recently,
discussions of privacy did not often indulge in the typically humbling and menial task of definition." Gerety,
supra note 71, at 237.
124. Bloustein, supra note 15, at 1004.
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however, the public disclosure tort implicates basic values of our constitutional
system.
A. Interest in Inviolate Personality
To be sure, public disclosure of private facts can result in severe psychic
distress, stemming from the nature of the revelation itself. By laying intimate
information open to public view, public disclosure assaults a person's indivi-
duality."2 The victim is outraged and mortified by having the public know her
most intimate secrets,' 2' and is robbed of the prerogative of making the
disclosure herself, thus losing control over her own life and identity. 27 The
violation of privacy is, essentially, a blow to human dignity or an injury to
individuality.'2 The world is a witness, a peeping Tom, to the victim's intimate
life. 9 Psychological studies indicate that the coming-out process is painful
even when voluntarily undertaken.1 30 Though the psychological ramifications
of outing remain "largely unstudied, '3 it stands to reason that forced
disclosure would be far more traumatic.
State 32 and federal133 legislatures, recognizing the importance of informa-
tional privacy, have enacted a multitude of provisions that forbid the disclosure
of private information by the government. Congress has recognized a funda-
mental constitutional right to informational privacy.'34 Courts have zealously
protected private information from government disclosure,1 35 holding official
125. Id. at 981.
126. Id.; Bloustein, supra note 119, at 619.
127. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure
in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 71 (1991).
128. Bloustein, supra note 15, at 973.
129. Id. at 979.
130. Harold P. Martin, M.D., The Coming-Out Process for Homosexuals, 42 HoSP. & CommuNITY
PSYCHIATRY 158 (1991).
131. Erik F. Strommen, "You're a What?": Family MemberReaction to the Disclosure of Homosexuality,
J. HOMOSEXUALITY, Vol. 18, Nos. 1/2, at 37, 54 (1989) (noting how little is known about ramifications
of discovery of homosexuality by family members).
132. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed."); CAL. CIrV. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1992) ("[All individuals have a right of privacy in
information pertaining to them."); HAWAn CoNST. art. I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
133. See Don R. Pember, The Burgeoning Scope of "Access Privacy" and the Portent for a Free Press,
64 IoWA L. REV. 1155, 1180 (1979). Certain provisions of the General Education Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(4) (1988), the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988), and the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988) can be used to restrict access to information in the government's control.
134. "The Congress finds that... the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected
by the Constitution of the United States." Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose, Privacy Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
135. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749 (1989) (upholding nonrelease of information under Freedom of Information Act exception); ACLU of
Mississippi v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.) (vacating lower court's order to disclose records
concerning state agency's efforts to maintain racial segregation because individual privacy rights were not
adequately considered), reh'g denied, 919 F.2d 735 (1990).
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action to implicate constitutional values.'36 While outings of prominent
homosexuals do not involve state action and thus do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, they nevertheless involve violations of the same, weighty interests,
"values... similar to those involved in battery, assault, and false imprisonment
cases": 3 7 the interest in preserving individual dignity against unreasonable
intrusions.1
38
B. Free Speech Interests
Although privacy is generally held to conflict with free speech, it actually
helps promote familiar First Amendment values. Privacy shields the individual
from "pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment," and other forms of societal
interference. 139 By providing a refuge, privacy enables individuals to deliberate
in solitude, develop opinions, form groups, and thereby acquire the strength to
dissent publicly.140 Privacy is thus essential to democratic government, fostering
moral autonomy and promoting the formation and dissemination of unorthodox
views.' 4' In NAACP v. Alabama,42 the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces the freedoms
of association and speech, prohibited the state-compelled disclosure of NAACP
members' names because such a revelation would have an adverse affect on
the group's ability to promote its platform. 143 The Court reasoned, "[i]nviola-
bility of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indis-
pensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs."'4 While outing does not implicate the First
136. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that "financial information .. . .albeit less intimate than medical information, is entitled to privacy
protection"); DeMasiv. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 119,121 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that"[i]t can scarcely be denied
that the public exposure of one's wallet or purse is ... an invasion of privacy" and that government disclosure
of financial matters "may well implicate constitutional rights").
137. Bloustein, supra note 15, at 1005.
138. Id. at 994-95. The current conception of the Fourth Amendment is more privacy-based than property-
based. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that Fourth Amendment protects
"people... not simply 'areas') and Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)
(stating that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property ....") with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,457-66 (1928) (finding wiretaps not covered
by Fourth Amendment because they did not involve actual physical invasion).
139. Gavison, supra note 119, at 448.
140. Id. at 450.
141. Id. at 455; Randall P. Bezanson, Public Disclosures as News: Injunctive Relief andNewsworthiness
in Privacy Actions Involving the Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1061, 1077 (1979); Kreimer, supra note 127, at
67.
142. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
143. Id. at 460, 463. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the right of association is protected
by the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Democratic Party
v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981).
144. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462. See generally THE CONSTITtmON OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, 1036-44 (1987) (discussing development and current
interpretation of right of association).
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Amendment where government action is not involved, the injured interests are
similar.
Outing uniquely illustrates the value of privacy in promoting sexual
autonomy and how the absence of privacy protection can chill free discussion.
The gay rights movement formed and gained strength in underground
meetings; 145 social pressures to conform would have .made it impossible to
do so in the open. Homosexuality is strongly condemned 146 and severely penal-
ized 47 in our society. This is reflected in the fact that the false imputation of
homosexuality is considered defamatory in the vast majority of states."4
Homosexuals are also frequently the target of hate crimes. 149 The pervasive
145. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 319; DJ. WEST, HOMOSEXUALTY RE-ExAMINED 143
(1977). One of the first homosexual organizations in the United States, the Mattachine Society, took its name
from the court jester who spoke truth while hiding behind a mask. Founded in 1950, it "dropped the mask"
of privacy in 1954, incorporated, and began publicly providing a number of services to the gay community.
id. at 143-44.
146. The percentage of Americans who believe that homosexual sex is "always wrong" has varied
between 70 and 75% since 1980. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 64 (1992). Studies indicate that
one-third of Americans surveyed have less favorable attitudes toward lesbians and gay men as a result of
the AIDS epidemic. EDrrORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 8 &
n.60 (1990) [hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW]; see also Gregory M. Herek, Myths About
Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 165 (1991).
147. In a recent survey, nearly one-fifth of gay men reported that they had lost jobs or been denied
employment because they were gay. SEXUAL ORIMNTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 146, at 65; see also
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that school board could dismiss
bisexual teacher after she revealed her sexual orientation to fellow staff, despite jury finding that her revelation
did not interfere with school operations), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist.
No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash.) (upholding school board decision to presume a homosexual teacher "immoral"
and thus unfit to teach), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). Gay men and lesbians can be denied entry to
the United States because of their sexual preference. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 146,
at 151-52. See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINOS LJ. 799 (1979).
Even outing advocates admit that the imputation of homosexuality can have a lasting impact on a
person's reputation and career. Activist Michelangelo Signorile concedes, "I can't say no one's career will
be hurt. in every movement, there's bound to be some discomfort." Broeske & Wilson, supra note 11, at
F90. One actor worries, "[homosexuality] freaks the audience out. ... This thing can completely destroy
careers." Id. at F6. For example, CBS cancelled actor Jim Nabors' variety show after rumors spread that
he was gay. Carla Hall, Encounters With a Man of Mystery, WASH. POST, July 23, 1986, at C2.
148. See, e.g., Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that publication by student
newspaper of letter indicating claimants were gay was libel per se); Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 369
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (holding that calling a man "queer" was defamatory because it imputed criminal
conduct, sodomy). In upholding a judicial finding that the imputation of homosexuality is defamatory, a
New York court concluded that:
It cannot be said that social opprobrium of homosexuality does not remain with us today. Rightly
or wrongly, many individuals still view homosexuality as immoral. Legal sanctions imposed upon
homosexuals in areas ranging from immigration to military service have recently been reaffirmed
despite the concurring Judge's observation in Watkins that it "demonstrates a callous disregard
for the progress American law and society have made toward acknowledging that an individual's
choice of life style is not the concern of government, but a fundamental aspect of personal liberty."
... [D]espite the fact that an increasing number of homosexuals are publicly expressing
satisfaction and even pride in their status, the potential and probable harm of a false charge of
homosexuality, in terms of social and economic impact, cannot be ignored.
Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1005 (App. Div. 1984) (citations omitted).
149. According to a recent study commissioned by the National Institute for Justice, homosexuals are
victimized more often than any other minority group. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 146,
at 31. One in five gay men, and one in ten lesbians reported being physically assaulted, according to another
study. Id.; Herek, supra note 146, at 166. The incidence of such hate crimes has increased as a result of
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disapproval of homosexuality makes social pressures to conform especially high;
without a viable right of informational privacy, the danger of stultifying free
thought is great.5 ° The Supreme Court could have been describing a homo-
sexual rights group when it wrote:
Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these
members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these
circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of [group]
membership is likely to affect adversely the [group's] ability.., to
foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that
it may induce members to withdraw . . . and dissuade others from
joining it because of fear of exposure.., and of the consequences of
this exposure.' 5'
Now, as in the heyday of McCarthyism,1 2 exposure as a homosexual can
effectively silence a person, subjecting him to ridicule and depriving him of
political and social associations fundamental to free speech interests. The fear
of exposure that outing engenders may cause many homosexuals to modify their
conduct and alter their associations in order to avoid detection. 53 Furthermore,
mass disclosures that can seriously impair political rights-such as disclosure
of membership rosters in Alabama in the 1950's or the publication of gay
students' names today' 54-differ only in scope'55 from individual outings.
Proponents of outing argue that if the liberty from constraining social norms
that is promoted by privacy is desirable, it is even more desirable to attack those
norms directly. Privacy, they argue, perpetuates the very problems it purports
to ease, reducing surface tensions while simultaneously maintaining the stigma
of homosexuality. Outing makes the public aware of the contributions of
homosexuals to society, promoting tolerance by heterosexuals and openness
among closet gays. Outing advocates have argued that, while sex itself is private,
sexual preference is not; because heterosexuality is not a private fact, homo-
the AIDS epidemic. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 146, at 31. See also People v. Nitz,
572 N.E.2d 895 (M1.) (involving gruesome bias murder of a homosexual), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991).
150. Kreimer, supra note 127, at70 & n.194 ("[Tihe pressure of visibility begins to reorganize behavior
at its source, shaping it in conformity with the normative standards of the observer.") (quoting Harvard
behavioralist Professor Shoshana Zuboft).
151. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
152. D'EIlvf.IO & FREEDMAN, supra note I, at 292-94.
153. It is conceivable that the outing of Pete Williams affected the ability of closeted homosexuals at
the Department of Defense to meet and associate, causing them to modify their behavior in order to avoid
detection in this notoriously homophobic institution.
154. See supra note 2.
155. Outers will surely assert that they would not perpetrate mass outings. However, British gays in
1991 announced that they would expose hundreds of closet homosexuals in Parliament, in the courts, and
in the Church. Neil McKenna, Outing's Bitter Truths, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), July 29, 1991, at 17.
The threat dissolved in the face of possible legal action. See British News in Brief, FAcTs ON FILE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, Aug. 8, 1991, at 601.
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sexuality should not be either. 56 To hold otherwise would be to perpetuate
the popular impression that homosexuality is immoral or unnatural.1
57
But this argument is disingenuous. First, homosexuality is not just like
heterosexuality; if it were, there would be no "closets" and everyone would be
"out." The continuing societal stigmatization of homosexuality 5' is what
motivates outing. Secondly, it is difficult to change positive morality. Even after
thirty years of civil rights legislation, racism pervades our society. Although
no studies have been conducted to determine how outing affects public views
of homosexuality, anecdotal evidence indicates that outing is no panacea. As
one lesbian wryly put it, "I'm still waiting for the news of Malcolm Forbes's
homosexuality to improve the quality of my life."'59 Under present circum-
stances, public disclosure can destroy lives while accruing only marginal gains
for gay rights. The only lasting effect is the burden on the target. 60
Moreover, depriving outing targets of a tort remedy is an inappropriate and
inefficient mechanism for changing public attitudes towards homosexuality. The
role of tort law is to make the injured whole, not to change social mores. Judges
have long recognized this truth in the field of defamation law, and thus "take
the world as [they] find it," even if those who would think less of the injured
party could be characterized as "wrong-thinking."' 6' Attitudes are best changed
in other ways, such as the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation, which
would improve the everyday lives of homosexuals in a systematic way.' 62
Proponents of outing must recognize that all they offer is a "quick fix,"
drawing attention to the cause of homosexuals for a few days or weeks. The
price exacted for outing is great. Outing erodes the privacy that was instrumental
in the formation of the gay rights movement, 63 and which allows most gays
156. Signorile, Yale Law School Address, supra note 6.
157. Ruth Harlow, American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, Address at Yale
Law School Symposium, Outing: The Debate Over Forcing Lesbian and Gay Public Figures Out of the Closet
(Dec. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Harlow, Yale Law School Address].
158. See supra notes 146-148.
159. Heller, supra note 5, at 13 (quoting Cindy Carr, an anti-outing journalist at the Village Voice).
In an interview last year, two outing practitioners (Mike Carson of ACT-UP New York and Bill Dobbs of
Queer Nation) could not point to any concrete political or social gains resulting from their activities. See
Charles Laurence, After the Stars Went Out, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 30, 1991, at 15. The public may perceive
outing as punishment, reinforcing the notion that homosexuality is shameful. Tim McFeeley, Director, Human
Rights Campaign Fund, Address at Yale Law School Symposium, Outing: The Debate Over Forcing Lesbian
and Gay Public Figures Out of the Closet (Dec. 4, 1991).
160. See Bezanson, supra note 141, at 1102.
161. Thus, for years courts considered the imputation of illegitimacy or rape defamatory, despite the
fact that allowing recovery perpetuated "wrong-thinking" social stigmas. CARTER, supra note 71, at 79-80;
KEETON Er AL, supra note 27, § 11l, at 777-78.
162. California Governor Pete Wilson recently signed into law a bill that "prohibit[s] discrimination
... in any aspect of employment... based on actual or perceived sexual orientation." 1992 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 915 (West); see also Jane Gross, In Reversal, California Governor Signs a Bill Extending Gay Rights,
N.Y. TmIES, Sept. 26, 1992, at 1. A few days earlier, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down that state's
sodomy law, holding that the statute violated the state constitutional right to privacy and the right to equal
treatment under the law. See Kentucky v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 WL.. 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992).
163. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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the autonomy to "come out" on their own timetable and of their own
volition."M Outing thus could potentially damage the cause of gay rights more
than it helps. In most areas of the country, outside of major cities and certain
progressive enclaves, revelation of a person's homosexuality could effectively
disband inchoate gay organizations. Outing a prominent gay banker in (say)
Omaha may make Nebraskans aware of gays in their midst, but at the cost of
destroying a network of associations built around him .165 Finally, by chipping
away at privacy rights, gay activists may cause setbacks in other areas in which
they still desire privacy, such as in mandatory AIDS testing and reporting.
III. OUTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment is couched in absolutist language: "Congress shall
make no law.. . ." Despite this sweeping admonition, the Supreme Court has
"long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance ' 166 and that speech can be regulated consistent with the First
Amendment. For example, speech may be regulated as to "time, place, and
manner."' 67 Some types of speech may be accorded reduced protection, notably
commercial speech 168 and defamatory speech.169 The Court has held that
some types of speech-obscene speech, "fighting words," and child pornogra-
phy-merit little or no First Amendment protection. 70 Thus, in practice, First
Amendment interests are not absolute, but must be weighed against competing
concerns. This Part attempts to determine whether outing speech can be restricted
in a manner consistent with First Amendment protections.
164. According to a national study, the average amount of time elapsed between when a person realized
he was gay and when he came out was 4.6 years. This length of time underlines the pressures gays feel
to conform. See Herek, supra note 146, at 146 (reporting survey of 113 lesbians and 287 gay men).
165. Some outing advocates purport only to out those persons who are prominent and powerful enough
that harm done to the target will be minimal. See Signorile, Yale Law School Address, supra note 6; Harlow,
Yale Law School Address, supra note 157. However, the assurances of a handful of practitioners is no
guarantee against what thousands of other activists might do.
166. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
167. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
168. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
758 (1976).
169. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
170. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and...
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace."). The Court has retreated from this statement in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112




A. The Purpose of First Amendment Protection
The central importance of speech on public issues, or "matters of public
concern," is long-established in First Amendment doctrine.171 Since New York
Times v. Sullivan,t72 the Supreme Court has placed speech regarding matters
of public concern squarely "at the heart of the First Amendment's
protections,"'173 and "on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values." 74 Such speech is of preeminent value because it transcends mere self-
expression. Freedom of expression concerning public questions "assure[s]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people,"' 75 and thus is "the essence of self-govern-
ment.' 76 The Court has found speech to merit full First Amendment protection
when it meets either the "status" test or the "content" test. 77 The "status" test
determines whether the subject of the speech is a public official 178 or fig-
ure.179 Speech concerning private figures is accorded lesser First Amendment
protection.180 The "content" test is met when the speech at issue is of public
concern.'
8 1
Supreme Court doctrine thus accords with the predominant scholarly theory
of the First Amendment, associated with Alexander Meiklejohn. 182 This theory
views speech as valuable principally because it is instrumental to democratic
government. Although this "instrumentalist" formulation of the First Amendment
has been caricatured as involving only explicitly political speech, in fact it
encompasses a broad range of expression, from purely political writings to
171. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2563-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
173. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
174. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
175. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
176. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
177. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) ("One can discern...
two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First Amendment. The first is
whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead a private figure. The second is whether the
speech at issue is of public concern.").
178. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
179. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
180. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
181. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,763 (1985) (holding that libelous
speech not regarding a matter of public concern enjoys no special constitutional immunity); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (suggesting that speech of public employees is protected if it is determined to
relate to "matters of 'public concern"'). Contrary to the popular view that content-based regulation of speech
is per se unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has noted that the content of speech can determine the level
of protection it is afforded. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545-47 (1992).
As Justice Stevens commented, "much of our First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the assumption
that content makes a difference." Id. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
22-27 (1948). Most critics of the Meiklejohn view concede the special importance of speech on public
interests. Professors Jackson and Jeffries observe, "the fighting issue is not the validity of Meiklejohn's insight
but rather its exclusivity." Thomas H. Jackson and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1979).
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creative literary works.18 3 To serve the ends of democratic government,
"[fireedom of discussion... must embrace all issues about which information
is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period."' ' This model provides the philosophical framework
for a hierarchical theory of speech. It extends maximum protection to matters
of clear relevance to self-government and lesser protection to matters of little
significance in the resolution of public controversies.
Outing practitioners themselves draw lines between different types of outing.
Two distinct varieties emerge, although there is some overlap. The first type
of outing-so-called "gratuitous" outing-merely identifies an individual as gay,
and does not attempt to imbue this fact with greater significance or relate it to
some greater controversy.185 The outings of Malcolm Forbes186 and Toni
Diaz 87 are paradigmatic: the articles that outed them conveyed little more
than simple allegations about these individuals' sexuality. The second type of
outing discloses a person's sexuality in the context of a controversy in which
he is involved, and is termed "political" outing. The outings of.Pete Williams'88
and Oliver Sipple 89 fall into this category.
The "content" test has been rendered all but irrelevant by the "status" test,
because courts assume that any statement made regarding a celebrity is of public
interest. 90 Two general arguments are advanced for the proposition that
statements about the sexual preference of celebrities are inherently newsworthy.
First, some argue that any statement made about a celebrity is, ipso facto, of
public interest. A second argument is that outing a celebrity creates a role model
for gays and an ambassador to straights, and thus engenders debate on public
issues. These arguments will be addressed in turn.
183. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 119, at 1597. Speech performs two basic functions in this model.
The first is to maintain the integrity of democratic self-government. Any speech which contributes to public
debate on political or social issues receives full First Amendment protection under this theory. The second
function is to communicate and develop culture. Id. Creative, expressive speech such as literature and dance
would thus come within the scope of constitutional protection. Id. at 1598.
184. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (Murphy, L).
185. See Laurence, supra note 159 (distinguishing between "gratuitous" and "political" outing); see
also Signorile, Yale Law School Address, supra note 6 (distinguishing between "active" and "passive" outing).
186. See Broeske & Wilson, supra note 11, at F6. Signorile, who "outed" Forbes, did so for three stated
reasons: (1) to set the history books straight, (2) to let the public know that "we [homosexuals] are
everywhere" and (3) to persuade gays to come out. Helier, supra note 5, at 12. The fact that Forbes was
dead releases OutWeek of any potential liability stemming from the incident, because privacy rights are
generaliy believed to expire with a person. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1977).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 87-95. Although Diaz involved a transsexual rather than a
homosexual, the parallel is close enough to be enlightening.
188. See supra note 4.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86.
190. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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B. Status: Is a Celebrity's Sexual Preference Inherently Newsworthy?
If there is a zone of privacy around the intimate details of even famous
individuals' lives, as the Supreme Court consistently has suggested in dicta,191
sexual orientation, as the most private of facts, 192 must fall within that zone.
Sexual orientation is distinct from conduct. 193 Whatever the "cause" of sexual
preference, sexuality inheres in the psyche, and need never be manifested in
a way that is visible to the public eye. 94 Perhaps for these reasons, one federal
court held disclosure of one's own sexual preference was not a matter of public
concern for First Amendment purposes within the context of employment. 95
The intimacy of the facts involved suggests that even celebrities should be
considered private figures with regard to their sexuality. Giving a celebrity
private status for this one subject would require that an outing meet the content
test-that it be relevant to a matter of public concern-in order to come within
the scope of the First Amendment's protection. There is precedent for this
proposal in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the defamation case Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,9  the Supreme Court held that the former wife of a wealthy
industrialist, manifestly a "celebrity,"' 97 had not forfeited her status as a private
figure with regard to her divorce. The Court based its conclusion on three factors.
First, Mary Alice Firestone had not voluntarily entered into the divorce
proceedings, and thus had not voluntarily assumed the risk of this publicity. 98
Second, Firestone had not assumed a position of "special prominence in the
resolution of public questions," 199 and thus did not come within the sweep
of the "status" test. Third, the Court observed, disclosing the details of many
courtroom battles "would add almost nothing toward advancing... uninhibited
debate on public issues' '2to and thus would not meet the requirements of the
"content" test. The Court implicitly rejected the "leave it to the press" model
191. See supra note 120; see also Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Ct. App. 1983)
("Public figures more celebrated than [Diaz] are entitled to keep some information of their... sexual relations
private.").
192. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
193. See Grant, supra note 15, at 107.
194. Id.; Herek, supra note 146, at 150-51 (describing biological, psychological, and social theories
of sexual preference).
195. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444,449 (6th Cir. 1984) (employee discharged
as consequence of revealing bisexuality to coworkers; such speech is not protected by First Amendment),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
196. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
197. Although the Court found her not to be a public figure for purposes of reporting on her divorce,
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Mary Alice Firestone was a "celebrity" or "public figure" for purposes
of privacy. She was married to "the scion of one of America's wealthier industrial families"; her divorce
was covered in Thne magazine; and the Court conceded that her divorce was "of interest to some portion
of the reading public." Id. at 450, 454. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 27, § 117, at 860.
198. 424 U.S. at 454.
199. Id. at 454-55 (citation omitted).
200. Id. at 457.
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of newsworthiness, 201 stating that to find the divorce proceedings of the
wealthy a "public controversy" for First Amendment purposes would "equate
'public controversy' with all controversies of interest to the public." 202
Firestone seems to stand for the proposition that, as to intimate matters,
celebrities are private figures. First, by finding that Mary Alice Firestone had
not assumed the risk of publicity arising from her divorce,0 3 the decision
supports the argument that waiver of privacy rights must be full, knowing, and
voluntary, even in cases involving public figures.2° Second, Firestone indicates
that a person becomes a public figure only with respect to matters in which he
has assumed special prominence. This rule parallels the Restatement test, which
holds that "[s]ome reasonable proportion" must be maintained "between the event
or activity that makes the individual a public figure and the private facts to which
publicity is given. ' 2°5 Under the Firestone analysis, a gay celebrity would thus
retain privacy rights regarding his sexuality unless he made a full, knowing and
voluntary waiver of them, or unless his sexuality somehow became relevant to
some larger controversy.
C. Content: Is Sexual Preference Newsworthy in Context?
1. Gratuitous Outing: The "Role Model" Rationale
Advocates contend that each prominent homosexual outed serves as a role
model for other gays and as an ambassador to straights. As one commentator
has noted, "the very presence of prejudice" that makes outing so painful makes
an individual's sexual preference "a valuable subject of media coverage"; outing
a gay celebrity "takes the debate out of the abstract and onto a level with which
the general public can identify." Facts regarding a celebrity's sexuality are
thus relevant to the structuring of society, and therefore have some value as
speech. The Sipple court found this justification compelling enough to grant
such a disclosure First Amendment protection.2 7
This rationale does not fare well under closer scrutiny. Role model outing
violates the principle that the private facts disclosed should be relevant to what
makes the individual a public figure.208 One recent role model outing involved
a prominent record-industry businessman, David Geffen. 2 9 Geffen's sexual
201. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 and Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 353-55, for a
discussion of the "leave it to the press" model of newsworthiness.
202. 424 U.S. at 454.
203. Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 108-119.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
206. Wick, supra note 15, at 432.
207. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984).
208. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
209. Activists outed Geffen in 1991, ostensibly to provide a role model to gays in the record industry.
Heller, supra note 5, at 13; Signorile, Yale Law School Address, supra note 6.
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orientation had no discernible impact on his performance as President of Geffen
Records. If his sexuality is relevant to public debate, it is relevant only to the
general, sociological issue of the role of gays in society.
Competing interests clearly outweigh the limited benefits of role model
outing. Even under the best of circumstances, the relationship between outing
a particular figure and effecting a societal change is simply too attenuated
210
to override the outing target's privacy rights. Two courts have weighed the
equities in related public disclosure cases and found that mere relevance to broad
societal goals did not justify disclosure of private facts.211 Furthermore, the
role model rationale is unprincipled and liable to abuse. If gays need role models,
so does every other troubled minority, such as AIDS patients, rape victims, and
victims of child abuse.
2. Political Outing
Some commentators assert that a person's sexual preference is so private
that any disclosure should be actionable, and suggest extending absolute privacy
protection to all "the inner workings of a person's mind. 212 Under this
proposed regime, even political figures would possess an extensive zone of
privacy, because their private sexual orientation would only be of public concern
"in so far as [it is] acted upon.
21 3
Such blanket prohibitions on disclosure cannot be justified. Although
disclosure of a person's sexual preference is a grave invasion of privacy, there
are circumstances when sexual preference is relevant to self-government. For
example, a closeted government official who made disparaging public remarks
about homosexuals or who enforced discriminatory programs might be a valid
target for outing.2 4 Her hypocrisy calls into question her honesty and
210. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. Weighed against hypothetical benefits are very real
harms. See supra notes 146-155 and accompanying text
211. Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989),
involved a television documentary that questioned the guilt of a man convicted of rape. The court found
that specific facts, including defendant's name, were relevant to a matter of public concern because they
were "uniquely crucial" to revisiting the question of guilt; however, the court acknowledged that "the rape
victim's name may be irrelevant when ... the publisher's 'public concern' goes to a general, sociological
issue." Id. at 275. In Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983), the court rejected
defendant's attempts to relate the disclosure of plaintiff's transsexuality to the "contemporary social issue"
of "the changing roles of women in society." Id. at 773.
212. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 15, at 139.
213. Id. at n.261. Polls reflect popular support for such a position. A recent poll conducted by Time
magazine and the Cable News Network found that 72% of Americans believed outing to be wrong. 7unelCNN:
Opposition to Ban of Gays from Military, Outing, THE HOTLINE, Aug. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File.
214. As Congressman Barney Frank has said, "you cannot try to make sodomy illegal and then commit
sodomy yourself." Laurence, supra note 159, at 15.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
motivation, and thus information about her sexuality is relevant to the question
of her fitness for office.
215
Pete Williams, 1991's most prominent outing target, served as a spokesman
for the Pentagon. Though he was not personally responsible for the military's
longstanding policy of excluding gays from the armed services, statements
regarding his alleged sexual preference deserved full First Amendment protection
for several reasons. First, such claims (which concededly may or may not be
true) purported to call into question the character of a high public official who
helped implement a rule forbidding activities which he allegedly practiced.
Second, this claim was uniquely relevant to the broader question of gays in the
military. By alleging that a high official in the Department of Defense was
homosexual, the outers directly attacked one of the traditional rationales for
excluding gays from the military-that gays present a security risk.216 By
seeking to demonstrate that a gay upper-echelon official posed no threat to
security, the outers may have helped remove one stone from the wall that
officially excludes gays from the military. Months after the outing, Secretary
of Defense Cheney repudiated the security rationale as "an old chestnut.'
21 7
Granting full First Amendment protection is less clearly warranted when
a public official's sexual preference has not affected her actions, and her
campaign for office has done nothing to make her sexuality an issue. As George
Will has griped, the question "'Are [these charges] relevant?' is as important
as 'Are they true?' 21 8 In such cases, the outing may have been merely "morbid
and sensational prying" and thus not a matter of public concern. Conversely,
events can make a person's sexual preference newsworthy even when he is not
a government official and has not acted hypocritically. The Sipple case
exemplifies this. Sipple's sexuality became relevant (arguably) because it shed
light on President Ford's attitude towards gays.219 Because the information
potentially revealed the President's prejudices, its disclosure could be constitu-
tionally protected as relevant to the public decision of who should govern.220
Public figures are at times as politically influential as government officials.
Roy Cohn was a prominent American lawyer who was active in politics and
a sidekick to Senator McCarthy. Terry Dolan was a conservative Republican
215. The Supreme Court has recognized that
society's interest in the officers of government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of
official duties.... [Tihe public's interest extends to "anything which might touch on an official's
fitness for office .... Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than
dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect
the official's private character."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (citation omitted).
216. D'EMILIo & FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 292.
217. Barton Gellman, Cheney Rejects Idea That Gays Are Security Risk, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1991,
at A33; Maria Puente, Bill would bar gay GIs' discharge, USA TODAY, May 19, 1992, at 4A.
218. Will, supra note 10.
219. See supra text accompanying note 85.
220. See David A. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 493, 558 (1990).
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fundraiser who died of AIDS. Both were publicly anti-gay; both are reputed
to have led active lives as homosexuals. 221 Both had access to real political
power despite their nominally private status. As political figures, they were
accountable to the public for their honesty and motivation. By playing a
significant role in the resolution of public questions, they made their sexual
preference newsworthy.
The question becomes much more difficult with high-profile public figures,
such as actors and actresses. 222 Some outing advocates argue that Hollywood
is much more important than Washington, D.C. in shaping attitudes. They argue
that actors who glamorize heterosexuality or vilify homosexuality are even more
dangerous than their political kin.223 Telling the world that a major heartthrob
is homosexual may shape public views about how "normal" homosexuality is,
and therefore may affect public views about the regulation of homosexual
activity. However, cases such as Ross v. Midwest Communications21 suggest
that, to be newsworthy, disclosure of homosexuality must bear direct relevance
to matters of public concern to come within the ambit of full First Amendment
225protection. Outing as practiced by tabloids,226 which make no pretense of
imbuing such facts with political content, thus is mere "morbid and sensational
prying."
CONCLUSION
The outing controversy involves a direct clash between competing
values-the First Amendment and the common law right of privacy. When full
First Amendment protection is implicated, it dominates the hierarchy of rights,
and outing speech must be protected at the expense of privacy rights. However,
not all speech is of equal First Amendment value. When speech implicates less
221. See Mira Friedlander, Being Pulled Out of the Closet, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 3, 1991, at BI
(discussing Cohn); Out with "Outing", NEWSDAY, May 29, 1990, at 42 (discussing Dolan).
222. * Professor Frederick Schauer has argued persuasively that the "public figure" category of Supreme
Court defamation jurisprudence is overbroad and that defamatory commentary on such figures does not merit
blanket application of the Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard applied to public officials. Frederick
Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 905 (1984). Professor Schauer notes that the archetype
cases used in formulating the "public figure" test (Butts and Walker) both involved powerful individuals
in their respective communities who had placed themselves squarely at the heart of a controversy of great
public interest. Unwisely generalizing from these two cases, the Supreme Court concluded that public officials
and publie figures wield approximately equivalent influence in the resolution of government affairs. Id. at
915-16. Schauer argues that, had the archetype cases involved more typical facts, the Court would not have
accorded statements regarding all public figures equal First Amendment protection, because for many public
figures, exerting even an indirect influence on public policy is "aberrational." Id. at 917.
223. Signorile believes that famous actors like Rock Hudson glamorize heterosexuality. Signorile, Yale
Law School Address, supra note 6. Activists pointed fingers at Jodie Foster because she appeared in the
film, The Silence of the Lambs, which some said portrayed homosexuals in a bad light. See Heller, supra
note 5, at 12.
224. 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989).
225. Id. at 275.
226. The Globe's story on Lyle Alzado is a good example of this genre. See supra note 14.
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than full First Amendment protection, it can be regulated to advance a
compelling state interest-in this case, the protection of privacy rights.
Current law favors First Amendment interests to the virtual exclusion of
privacy rights, treating celebrities as public figures even for purposes of their
sexuality. This balance of constitutional and common law rights is erroneous.
Because it need never be manifested publicly, sexual preference is not inherently
newsworthy. The disclosure of a person's sexual preference is therefore of lesser
First Amendment value unless it is relevant to a "matter of public concern."
When activists out a prominent figure to provide a positive example of
homosexuals-so-called "role model" outing-information about his sexuality
is relevant only to the general, sociological issue of the role of gays in society.
In such cases, the privacy interest is at its apex while the interest in disclosure
is at its nadir.227 The compelling state interests advanced by privacy rights
should therefore prevail.
Though sexuality need not be public, it can become so under certain
circumstances. Officials may make their sexuality relevant to a public controversy
(by being hypocritical), and private citizens may be thrust into the public eye
in such a way as to make their sexuality relevant (as in the case of Oliver
Sipple). Outings performed to accomplish immediate political objectives-so-
called "political" outings-are directly relevant to governance and thus deserve
full First Amendment protection.
Examination of the two types of outing speech-role model outing and
political outing-suggests that Supreme Court jurisprudence is inadequate to
balance competing First Amendment and privacy interests in outing cases.
Current law emphasizes the status of the subject, rather than the content of the
disclosure. The foregoing analysis of outing suggests that this emphasis is
backwards. Status is not relevant for determining the constitutional protection
of outing speech because, as Time v. Firestone228 suggests, all persons, famous
and obscure, are private figures for purposes of their sexuality. Instead, the
appropriate inquiry is the content test, which determines whether the individual's
sexual orientation is relevant to a public controversy. Judicial implementation
of revised standards would not be overly onerous: despite predictions of doom
from academic writers, the courts have shown some facility in making
distinctions between public matters and private matters. Removing the distraction
of the status test may make the determination easier.
227. Cf. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
780 (1989) (discussing privacy interests in maintaining confidentiality of arrest records).
228. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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